University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review
Volume 44

Issue 3

Article 4

2022

Arkansas’s Civil Asset Forfeiture Statute and the Eighth
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause
Aaron Newell

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Aaron Newell, Arkansas’s Civil Asset Forfeiture Statute and the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines
Clause, 44 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 427 (2022).
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol44/iss3/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has been
accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen Law
Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu.

ARKANSAS’S CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE STATUTE AND THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT’S EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the Old Testament of the Bible, when an ox killed a man it was
deemed guilty and sentenced to death.1 In ancient Greece, guilty property
was banished from the country.2 Roman law forced citizens to forfeit livestock that caused injury.3 These are three older examples of asset forfeiture,
where property is charged in a court of law.4
Today, asset forfeiture is primarily used to take money and property
from criminals involved in the drug trade5 and use those proceeds to fight
crime.6 Law enforcement seizes cash, vehicles, guns, and real property.7
Asset forfeiture is used in all states, including Arkansas.8 In Arkansas, law
enforcement can seize cash, vehicles, real property, and anything else of
value that is used or exchanged in connection with a substance classified as
a controlled or counterfeit substance under Arkansas law.9
The seizure of property serves two primary purposes. The first is remedial to remove the instruments of the drug trade from criminals.10 The second purpose is punitive—to punish those involved in criminal activity by
seizure and forfeiture of property.11
The federal government’s power to use forfeiture as punishment by extracting money through fines and other types of payment has been limited
since the ratification of the Bill of Rights within the Constitution, through
the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.12 At ratification, the Excessive Fines Clause prevented the federal government from imposing fines
1. Exodus 21:28.
2. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (Stuart E. Thiel & David Widger eds.,
Project Gutenberg 2013) (1881) (ebook).
3. The Laws of the Twelve Tables, tbl. VII., Law I., reprinted in THE CIVIL LAW (Samuel P. Scott trans., 1932).
4. See 36 AM. JUR. 2d Forfeitures and Penalties § 1 (2020).
5. See id.
6. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(2)(A) (1996) (amended 2000).
7. Id. § 881(a).
8. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-505 (West 2021).
9. Id.
10. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621–22 (1993).
11. Id.
12. Browning–Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 266–68
(1989) (“[T]he history of the Eighth Amendment convinces us that the Excessive Fines
Clause was intended to limit only those fines directly imposed by, and payable to, the government.”).
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that grossly exceeded a defendant’s ability to pay.13 In 2019, this limitation
was extended to the States through the incorporation of the Excessive Fines
Clause in the Eighth Amendment in Timbs v. Indiana.14 This was a monumental change in the law because now the governments at both the state and
federal levels are limited by the Excessive Fines Clause in their power to
extract payments as a punishment for a criminal offense.15 This Note reviews the incorporation of the Excessive Fines Clause and its impact on
state civil forfeiture actions.
This Note argues that the Excessive Fines Clause governs state civil
forfeiture actions under Arkansas law that serve a punitive purpose. Arkansas is limited in its power to punish through extracting payments after incorporation of the Excessive Fines Clause.16 Since the Excessive Fines Clause
is incorporated against the State, any action that is considered punitive and
that involves an extraction of payment to the government must be analyzed
under the Excessive Fines Clause.17 Because civil asset forfeiture in Arkansas is both punitive and a payment to the government, the Excessive Fines
Clause governs these actions.18
Section II of this Note provides an overview of civil asset forfeiture,
with Part A examining its history and statistics,19 and Part B examines its
mechanics.20 Section III considers the federal background of civil asset forfeiture, with Section IV covering Arkansas civil asset forfeiture law.21 Finally, Section V argues that Arkansas civil forfeiture law is punitive in nature
and thus governed by the Excessive Fines Clause under the standards estab-

13. Nicholas M. McLean, Livelihood, Ability to Pay, and the Original Meaning of the
Excessive Fines Clause, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833, 870 (2013) (discussing the early
history of the Excessive Fines Clause and one case in which the Supreme Court stated that
the large criminal fine imposed on a bankrupt person was excessive as the fine was impossible to pay).
14. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 686–87 (2019) (holding that the protections
against excessive fines is fundamental and deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition,
and therefore should be incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW-SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 14.2 (updated May 2021) (explaining that incorporation
into the Fourteenth Amendment is done selectively, rather than wholesale, through both the
privileges and immunities clause and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
15. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 14, § 14.2(a); United States v. Bajakajian, 524
U.S. 321, 328 (1998).
16. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 618; Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 686–87.
17. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 686–87; See infra Section IV.
18. See infra Section IV.
19. See infra Section II.A.
20. See infra Section II.B.
21. See infra Sections III, IV.

2022]

CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE STATUTE

429

lished by the Supreme Court to determine if a law serves a punitive purpose.22
Arkansas’s law is punitive in nature because forfeiture has historically
been considered punishment, both at the federal level23 and in Arkansas.24
To illustrate, Arkansas law explicitly includes an innocent owner defense
that shifts the focus to the culpability of the owner.25 This reveals an intent
to punish only those involved in the drug trade.26 Additionally, Arkansas law
ties the forfeiture to the commission of an offense, also revealing an intent
to punish those involved in drug trafficking.27
II.
A.

AN OVERVIEW OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE GENERALLY

Civil Asset Forfeiture: How Did We Get Here?

While modern forfeiture looks quite different from ancient forfeiture, it
can still trace its roots back to ancient times.28 An examination of this lineage through the concept of deodands paid to the King, forfeiture in the colonies and in the First Congress, and the modern revival of forfeiture in the
war on drugs provides valuable context for how modern forfeiture law has
developed to its current form.29
While the legal fiction that property can be guilty can be traced back to
ancient Israel,30 modern in rem forfeiture has its roots in the medieval law of
deodands.31 The word “deodand” comes from the Latin deo dandum, meaning “to be given to God,” and property would be given up to atone for the
property’s guilt.32 The deodand was forfeited to the Crown to provide money
for religious services “for the good of the dead man’s soul.”33 Eventually,
22. See infra Section V.
23. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 618 (1993); Eric C. Surette, Annotation,
When Does Forfeiture of Currency, Bank Account, or Cash Equivalent Violate Excessive
Fines Clause of Eighth Amendment, 164 A.L.R. Fed. 591, at 2 (2000) (“It is well established
that a forfeiture of property is the equivalent of a fine and therefore is subject to the Eighth
Amendment’s limitations.”).
24. Gallia v. State, 287 Ark. 176, 179, 697 S.W.2d 108, 110 (1985).
25. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-505(a)(4)(B), (a)(6)(B), (a)(8)(A) (Supp. 2021).
26. See, e.g., Austin, 509 U.S. at 620.
27. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-505(a).
28. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
29. Brittany Hunter, A History of Civil Asset Forfeiture in America, TENTH AMENDMENT
CTR. (Apr. 12, 2019), https://tenthamendmentcenter.com/2019/04/12/a-history-of-civil-assetforfeiture-in-america/.
30. Exodus 21:28.
31. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 (1974).
32. Id. at 681 n.16; David Pimental, Forfeiture Procedure in Federal Court: An Overview, 183 F.R.D. 1, 4 (1999).
33. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681.
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the deodand was justified primarily as a penalty for carelessness and became
a regular source of the Crown’s revenue.34
Deodands themselves did not become part of the common law tradition
of the United States,35 but another form of English law that likely was derived from deodands—statutory forfeiture.36 For example, the English Navigation Acts of 1660 punished violations of the act with the forfeiture of any
illegally carried goods as well as the ship that carried them.37
Statutory forfeiture took hold in the Colonies38 and continued after the
Constitution was ratified, when the First Congress passed laws allowing
forfeiture of ships and cargo involved in customs offenses.39 The federal
government used forfeiture to fund wars, including the War of 1812, the
Civil War, and the Spanish American War.40 The use of forfeiture declined
after those wars41 but briefly resurged during prohibition to prosecute bootleggers.42
Modern asset forfeiture began when its use increased during the war on
drugs.43 In 1970, Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, which allowed for the seizure of drugs and personal
equipment.44 In 1978, Congress passed the Psychotropic Substances Act,
which allowed for the seizure of money and securities used in drug-related
crimes.45 Then, in 1984, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, which allowed for the seizure of any property related to drug
crime.46

34. Id.
35. Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate, 188 S.W. 54, 55 (Tenn. 1916).
36. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683.
37. Pimental, supra note 32, at 4–5; Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 612 (1993).
38. C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 145 (1943).
39. Austin, 509 U.S. at 613.
40. Annie Depper & J. Blake Hendrix, Land Rovers, Excessive Fines, and Selective
Incorporation: Civil Asset Forfeiture After Timbs v. Indiana, 54 ARK. LAW. 14, 16,
https://issuu.com/arkansas_bar_association/docs/lawyer_summer_019issuu.
41. Id.
42. Id.; see, e.g., C.I.T. Corp. v. United States, 40 F.2d 825, 825–26 (8th Cir. 1930).
43. See Darpana M. Sheth, Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Forfeiture Laws, 14
ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GRPS. 24, 25. In June 1971, President Richard Nixon
declared that drug abuse was “public enemy number one” and the United States focused on
eliminating illegal drug use by “increasing penalties, enforcement, and incarceration for drug
offenders.”
BRITANNICA,
War
On
Drugs
United
States
History,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/war-on-drugs (Dec. 2021).
44. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84
Stat. 1236, 1276 (1970); Hunter, supra note 29.
45. Psychotropic Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 95-633, Nov. 10, 1978, 92 Stat 3768
(1978); Hunter, supra note 29.
46. Comprehensive Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat 1837 (1984);
Hunter, supra note 29.
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Asset forfeiture has grown tremendously since the introduction of these
laws.47 In 1986, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Assets Forfeiture Fund
took in $93.7 million in proceeds from asset forfeiture.48 That number had
grown to $500 million by 2003 and reached $1.8 billion in 2011.49 In Arkansas, nearly $59 million in cash has been seized and forfeited to law enforcement between 2010–2018.50
Forfeiture is very different today from what it was in medieval times;
for example, citizens no longer pay fines to a king.51 Thoroughly understanding the history and process of civil forfeiture can clarify why the Excessive Fines Clause properly governs forfeiture today.
B.

Civil Asset Forfeiture: Background, and an Example from Timbs

The process of civil asset forfeiture involves two primary steps.52 First,
police seize property they believe was involved in a crime.53 Second, the
government files a civil in rem lawsuit against the property for forfeiture of
the property.54 If the government wins the lawsuit and the property is forfeited, the government takes title to the property.55
Property seized under civil asset forfeiture most often includes contraband, cash, vehicles, and guns.56 Other property can be taken as well, including real property, jewelry, electronics, and home furnishings. 57 Police can
seize property under civil asset forfeiture when they have probable cause to
believe that the property or proceeds are traceable to an unlawful act.58
Because the lawsuit against the seized property is brought in civil
court, property owners are not entitled to the same protections they would
receive in a criminal lawsuit.59 Property owners do not have the right to be
47. Sheth, supra note 43, at 25.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Civil Asset Forfeiture in Arkansas May Change After US Supreme Court Ruling, But
the State Could Do More to Protect Arkansans, UNIV. OF CENT. ARK., ARK. CTR. FOR RES. IN
ECONS. (Feb. 21, 2019), uca.edu/acre/2019/02/21/civil-asset-forfeiture-may-change [hereinafter Civil Asset Forfeiture in Arkansas].
51. See McLean, supra note 13, at 856.
52. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-505(c), (g) (West 2019).
53. Id. § 5-64-505(c).
54. Id. § 5-64-505(g) (also allowing in personam jurisdiction); 36 AM. JUR. 2D Forfeitures and Penalties § 29, Westlaw (updated Nov. 2020).
55. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-505(h); see 36 AM. JUR. 2D Forfeitures and Penalties § 75,
Westlaw (updated Nov. 2020).
56. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-505(a); Civil Asset Forfeiture in Arkansas, supra note 50.
57. DICK M. CARPENTER II, ET AL., POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET
FORFEITURE 8 (2d ed. 2015).
58. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-505(c).
59. Depper & Hendrix, supra note 40, at 15.
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appointed a lawyer if they cannot afford one.60 The government needs to
prove by only a preponderance of the evidence that the seized property is
guilty, rather than proving this beyond a reasonable doubt.61 Furthermore, if
the property owner fails to file an answer, the property can be forfeited by
default.62
Timbs v. Indiana is an excellent example of how the process of civil asset forfeiture works: law enforcement arrested Tyson Timbs for dealing in a
controlled substance and conspiracy to commit theft, and seized Timbs’s
Land Rover SUV during the arrest.63 The SUV was worth about $42,000—
paid for out of the proceeds from Timbs’s father’s life insurance policy. 64
The trial court convicted Timbs, and he had to serve one year of home detention, five years of probation, and pay fees and costs of $1,203.65
Indiana then filed to forfeit Timbs’s Land Rover, arguing that Timbs
had used the vehicle to transport heroin.66 The trial court found that the SUV
had been used to violate a criminal statute but denied the forfeiture, as the
vehicle was worth more than four times the maximum fine Timbs could be
fined for his drug conviction.67 Since the forfeiture would be grossly disproportionate to Timbs’s offense, the court stated that the forfeiture was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.68 The
Supreme Court of Indiana reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that
the Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to state actions.69 Timbs petitioned for certiorari, arguing that the Excessive Fines Clause should be incorporated against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment.70
The Supreme Court of the United States vacated and remanded the Supreme Court of Indiana’s decision,71 holding that the Excessive Fines Clause
must be incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.72 The Supreme Court of Indiana would thus have to determine if the
forfeiture of the vehicle was a fine subject to the Excessive Fines Clause.73
Timbs provides a great example of the process of civil asset forfeiture.
However, it doesn’t explain everything. A deeper understanding of the fed60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-505(g)(5)(A) (West 2020).
139 S. Ct. 682, 686 (2019).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 686.
Id. at 690.
Id. at 691.
See id. at 689.
State v. Timbs, 134 N.E.3d 12, 23 (Ind. 2019).
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eral background of forfeiture— and the decision of the court in Austin v.
United States74—is necessary to understand the punitive nature of Arkansas’s law.
III.

FEDERAL LAW BACKGROUND

Understanding federal forfeiture and the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment is the cornerstone of comprehending how local asset
forfeiture can be punitive. The text of the Eighth Amendment is concise:
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.”75
The Supreme Court of the United States first applied the Excessive
Fines Clause in its United States v. Bajakajian decision in 1998.76 The defendant in Bajakajian was charged with failing to report the $357,144 he
was carrying as he was leaving the country.77 The defendant had legally obtained the money and was transporting it to pay a lawful debt.78 To determine if the government could order the forfeiture of the money, the Supreme
Court had to determine if the Excessive Fines Clause applied and if the forfeiture would violate the Clause.79
The Supreme Court had elsewhere held that at the time the Amendment
was written, the word “fine” meant “a payment to a sovereign as punishment
for some offense.”80 The government further held in Austin that these payments can be either in cash or in kind.81
The Court thus held in Bajakajian that the forfeiture of $357,144 was a
punishment subject to analysis under the Excessive Fines Clause.82 Additionally, it established for the first time a rule for when a fine is excessive.83
A fine that is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense is a violation of the Excessive Fines Clause.84
While the analysis of gross disproportionality is outside the subject of
this Note, it is important to know how sparingly the Court has interpreted

74. See 509 U.S. 602, 609–11 (1993) (establishing factors for determining when a forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause).
75. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
76. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 344 (1998) (Kennedy, J. dissenting).
77. Id. at 324–25.
78. Id. at 326.
79. Id. at 324.
80. Browning–Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265
(1989).
81. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609–10 (1993).
82. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 333–34.
83. Id. at 334.
84. Id. at 334–37.
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and applied the Excessive Fines Clause.85 The Court began reviewing the
Excessive Fines Clause more recently due to the modern revival of punitive
forfeiture during the war on drugs.86 Austin highlights this revival.87
In Austin, the Court considered, for the first time, whether the Excessive Fines Clause applied to civil in rem forfeitures.88 There, the petitioner
pleaded guilty to possessing cocaine with intent to distribute; the United
States government filed an in rem lawsuit seeking the forfeiture of his mobile home and auto body shop.89 The Supreme Court had to consider whether the Excessive Fines Clause applied to the forfeiture of property under the
federal forfeiture statute.90 First, the Court conducted an analysis to determine whether or not forfeiture was understood at least in part as punishment
when the Excessive Fines Clause was written.91 Second, the Court had to
decide whether the forfeiture statute examined in the case was understood in
part as punishment.92
The Court held that civil in rem forfeitures under the federal forfeiture
statute were at least in part punitive.93 The Court went through a historical
analysis to first determine whether the Framers would have considered forfeiture a punishment.94 This historical analysis involved looking at where
forfeitures came from—English Common Law.95
The Court, in its historical analysis, discussed the three types of forfeiture under English law: “deodand, forfeiture upon conviction for a felony or
treason, and statutory forfeiture.”96 Deodands were property that caused accidental death, and the property would be forfeited to the King as punishment for the owner’s negligence.97 The second type of English forfeiture,
forfeiture upon conviction of felony or treason, was clearly designed “to
punish felons and traitors . . . on the ground that property was a right derived
from society which one lost by violating society’s laws.”98 The last kind of
85. Id. at 335.
86. See supra Section II.A.
87. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S 602 (1993).
88. Id. at 604, 610–11.
89. Id. at 604–05.
90. Id.; see also 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1996) (amended 2000) (stating what types of items are
subject to forfeiture, such as controlled substances, conveyances, real property, and firearms;
and stating what the seizure procedures are, the disposition of forfeited property, the procedure for destruction of controlled substances, and how the rights in property vest to the United States once the property is forfeited).
91. Austin, 509 U.S. at 610–18.
92. Id. at 619–22.
93. Id. at 621–22.
94. Id. at 610–614.
95. Id. at 611.
96. Id.
97. Austin, 509 U.S. at 611.
98. Id. at 611–12.
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forfeiture is that which “took hold in the United States”—statutory forfeiture.99 This forfeiture provided that objects used in violations of customs and
revenue laws could be forfeited—such as ships that violated the Navigation
Acts of 1660.100 Statutory forfeiture was a mix of the deodand tradition and
forfeiture upon conviction of treason and felonies, and thus had a similar
punitive aspect.101 This aspect is that statutory forfeiture was also justified as
a penalty for negligence.102
After the United States gained independence, the First Congress adopted statutory forfeiture when it passed laws allowing forfeiture of ships that
were involved in customs offenses.103 Prior to independence, common law
courts in the Colonies were administering English and local forfeiture statutes.104 Other reasons the Court in Austin gave for understanding these laws
to be punitive were: (1) forfeiture was listed alongside other provisions for
punishment, and (2) “forfeit” was the word used for fine.105
After conducting a historical analysis, the Court examined case law to
determine whether in rem forfeiture is punitive.106 The Court held that case
law has long provided that statutory forfeiture imposes punishment.107 In one
of the Court’s earliest cases, Chief Justice Marshall had stated that forfeiture
could not be imposed as punishment unless the owner knew of the violation
of the law.108 The Court also looked at a long line of cases where the Court
has rejected the “innocence” of the owner as a defense to forfeiture.109 Those
decisions held that even innocent owners, ones who did not have knowledge
of their property’s being used in breaking the law, must be punished for
their negligence in allowing the property to be used in an offense.110
99. Id. at 613.
100. Id. at 612.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 612–13 (“‘But the Owners of Ships are to take Care what Master they employ,
and the Master what Mariners; and here Negligence is plainly imputable to the Master; for he
is to report the Cargo of the Ship, and if he had searched and examined the Ship with proper
care, according to his Duty, he would have found the Tea . . . and so might have prevented
the Forfeiture.’” (quoting Mitchell v. Torup, Park. 227, 145 Eng.Rep. 764, 768 (Ex.1766))).
103. Austin, 509 U.S. at 613.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 614.
106. Id. at 614–19.
107. Id. at 614.
108. Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 347, 364 (1808) (“The court is also of opinion,
that the removal for which the act punishes the owner with a forfeiture of the goods must be
made with his consent or connivance, or with that of some person employed or trusted by
him. If, by private theft, or open robbery, without any fault on his part, his property should be
invaded, while in the custody of the officer of the revenue, the law cannot be understood to
punish him with the forfeiture of that property.”).
109. Austin, 509 U.S. at 615.
110. Id.

436

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

The Court then considered whether the forfeitures under the federal
statutes should be considered punishment.111 The Court held that forfeitures
under the statutes were punishment, for the following reasons: (1) there was
nothing in the text of the statute or the legislative history contradicting the
historical understanding that forfeiture is in part punitive; (2) the forfeiture
statutes expressly provide an innocent owner defense, indicating that forfeiture can be a punishment for negligence; and (3) Congress chose to connect
the forfeiture directly to drug offenses.112 Here follows a brief discussion of
each of these three points.
The lack of contradictory text in the statute or legislative history as
compared to the historical understanding of forfeiture as punishment was
one of the main factors that led the Court to conclude the federal statute was
punitive, and in fact the legislative history actually bolstered its analysis.113
Several examples in the legislative history showed Congress meant for forfeiture to serve as punishment.114 When Congress added the sections of the
law under scrutiny in Austin, it recognized that fines and imprisonment were
not enough to deter or punish those who trade in dangerous drugs.115 Congress specifically stated that forfeiture of real property was “a powerful deterrent.”116 The Court used these statements by Congress to show that these
provisions are punitive and not remedial only.117
Another way the Court showed that the forfeiture statute is punitive
was through the included innocent owner provisions.118 The three innocent
owner provisions in the federal statute at the time of Austin were 21 U.S.C.
§§ 881(a)(4)(A), (a)(4)(C), and (a)(7).119 The first provision in §
881(a)(4)(A) stated:
[N]o conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the transaction of business as a common carrier shall be forfeited under the provisions of this section unless it shall appear that the owner or other person
in charge of such conveyance was a consenting party or privy to a violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter.120

111. Id. at 619–22.
112. Id. at 619–20.
113. Id. at 619.
114. Id. at 620.
115. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 191 (1983) (“[T]he traditional criminal sanctions of fine and
imprisonment are inadequate to deter or punish the enormously profitable trade in dangerous
drugs . . . .”); Austin, 509 U.S. at 620.
116. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 195 (1983).
117. Austin, 509 U.S. at 620–22.
118. Id. at 619.
119. See id.
120. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(A) (1996) (amended 2000).
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This section states that a common carrier will not be held liable for a
violation of the subchapter unless they were a consenting party or privy to
that violation. Section 881(a)(4)(C) subjects the following property to forfeiture:
[N]o conveyance shall be forfeited under this paragraph to the extent of
an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by
that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge,
consent, or willful blindness of the owner.121

This section has to do with conveyances being used for a violation of
the subchapter unless the owner of the conveyance knows, consented, or had
willful blindness as to the violation being committed with the owner’s conveyance. Finally, § 881(a)(7) stated:
All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any
leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any
manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation
of this subchapter punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent
of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established
by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge
or consent of that owner.122

This provision stated that real property could be forfeited when used to
facilitate a violation of the subchapter punishable by more than a year’s imprisonment. However, it does provide an exception for an owner of real
property who did not have actual knowledge of the violation.
The Austin Court refers to these provisions to explain that these innocent owner exemptions focus on the culpability of the owner as a way to
impose a punishment for owners who were not entirely innocent.123 Essentially, these innocent owner provisions provide exceptions for those owners
who did nothing wrong. Because they focus on the innocence or guilt of the
owner and provide an exception to forfeiture for owners who were innocent,
the provisions are intended to punish through forfeiture only those owners
who were not innocent.
Additionally, the Court in Austin also held that the statute was punitive
in part because of the link between the forfeiture and drug offenses.124 In §
881(a)(4), a conveyance could be forfeited if it was used or intended to be

121.
122.
123.
124.

21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C) (1996) (amended 2000).
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1996) (amended 2000).
Austin, 509 U.S. at 619.
Id. at 620.
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used in a drug offense.125 Section 881(a)(7) also states that real property
could be forfeited for the same cause.126 The Court ultimately held the statute, at least in part, was punitive due to the legislature’s tying forfeiture to
crime; this showed an intent to punish those involved with the commission
of crimes.127
Austin is important because it establishes that the Excessive Fines
Clause can apply to both civil cases and to an in rem forfeiture proceeding.128 However, when Austin was decided, the Excessive Fines Clause applied to only the federal government; today, it also applies to the States as a
result of Timbs.129
In 1791, the Bill of Rights did not bind the States.130 Only after the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment did the Bill of Rights begin to apply
to the States.131 The protections contained in the Bill of Rights are incorporated against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment when they are
“fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty” or “deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition.”132
In Timbs, the Supreme Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause is
both deeply rooted and fundamental.133 From the Magna Carta to the Virginia Declaration of Rights to the constitutions of all fifty States, the protection
against excessive fines has been a constant guard against government power
and overreach.134
Even though Austin was decided under federal forfeiture law, now that
the Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated, the protection of the Clause applies equally to both the States and the federal government.135 Timbs is a
historic decision because the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Excessive Fines Clause, including the circumstances in which it applies, now
binds the States.136 Put simply, States such as Arkansas can no longer impose excessive fines as defined by the Supreme Court.137
125. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1996) (amended 2000).
126. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1996) (amended 2000).
127. Austin, 509 U.S. at 619.
128. Id. at 618, 622.
129. See generally Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019).
130. Id. at 687.
131. Id.; see generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L. J. 1193 (1992). “Justice Brennan tried to steer a middle course of ‘selective incorporation.’ Under this third approach, the Court’s analysis could proceed clause by
clause, fully incorporating every provision of the Bill deemed ‘fundamental’ without deciding in advance whether each and every clause would necessarily pass the test.” Id. at 1196.
132. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 764–67 (2010).
133. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 689.
134. Id. at 687–90.
135. Id. at 689.
136. Id.
137. See id.
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The incorporation of the Excessive Fines Clause raises the question of
whether the Clause applies to forfeitures under Arkansas law. To answer
this question, an understanding of and some background regarding Arkansas
forfeiture law is required.
IV.

ARKANSAS’S FORFEITURE LAW

An understanding of Arkansas’s forfeiture law begins with where it is
located in the Arkansas Code. Arkansas’s forfeiture law is contained in the
Arkansas Code Annotated at § 5-64-505, which is entitled “Property subject
to forfeiture—Procedure—Disposition of property.”138 This section of the
Code is found in the chapter concerning controlled substances, which in turn
is located in Title 5 of the Arkansas Code, which concerns criminal offenses.139
Arkansas’s statute contains innocent owner provisions similar to those
analyzed in Austin, in four subdivisions of § 5-64-505.140 The statute contains an innocent owner provision in § 5-64-505(a)(6)(B):
[N]o property shall be forfeited under this subdivision (a)(6) to the extent
of the interest of an owner by reason of any act or omission established
by him or her, by a preponderance of the evidence, to have been committed or omitted without his or her knowledge or consent. 141

Here, the innocent owner exception applies to owners of anything of
value, such as firearms, that may be furnished in exchange for controlled
substances. The owner of this value cannot have his or her property forfeited
unless he or she had actual knowledge of the criminal offense. There is another innocent owner provision in § 5-64-505(a)(8)(A):
No real property is subject to forfeiture under this chapter by reason of
any act or omission established by the owner of the real property by a
preponderance of the evidence to have been committed or omitted without his or her knowledge or consent. 142

This provision states that real property may not be forfeited unless the
owner of the property had actual knowledge or consent of the criminal act
leading to seizure. Each of these provisions provides an exception to forfeiture when the owner did not have knowledge or consent of the act or commission that was a violation of the law.143
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-505 (West 2019).
Id.
Id. §§ 5-64-505(a)(4)(A), (a)(4)(B)(i), (a)(6)(B), (a)(8)(A).
Id. § 5-64-505(a)(6)(B).
Id. § 5-64-505(a)(8)(A).
Id. §§ 5-64-505(a)(6)(B), (a)(8)(A).
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The statute provides a third innocent owner provision in § 5-64505(a)(4)(A):
No conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the transaction of business as a common carrier is subject to forfeiture under this
section unless it appears that the owner or other person in charge of the
conveyance is a consenting party or privy to a violation of this chapter.144

This innocent owner exception provides that unless the owner or another having authority over the conveyance being used as a common carrier
is a consenting or aware party to a criminal offense, the conveyance cannot
be forfeited.
The fourth and final innocent owner provision is found in § 5-64505(a)(4)(A), and explains that the owner of a conveyance must have some
knowledge or provide consent to the use of the conveyance in violation of
the subchapter:
No conveyance is subject to forfeiture under this section by reason of
any act or omission established by the owner of the conveyance to have
been committed or omitted without his or her knowledge or consent. 145

But this subsection dealing with conveyances also contains an exception to this innocent owner provision.146 This exception to the innocent owner exception states that those owners without knowledge but should reasonably have known of the use may have their property forfeited:
Upon a showing described in subdivision (a)(4)(B)(i) of this section by
the owner or interest holder, the conveyance may nevertheless be forfeited if the prosecuting attorney establishes that the owner or interest holder
either knew or should reasonably have known that the conveyance would
be used to transport or in any manner to facilitate the transportation for
the purpose of sale or receipt of property described in subdivision (a)(1)
or subdivision (a)(2) of this section.147

This exception narrows the innocent owner exception for conveyances
in subdivision (a)(4)(B)(i): owners who knew or should have known about
the use of the conveyance, even without actual knowledge or consent, may
have to forfeit the conveyance148 The previous innocent owner exceptions,
including the innocent owner exception for conveyances, applied when the

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-505(a)(4)(A).
Id. § 5-64-505(a)(4)(B)(i).
Id. § 5-64-505(a)(4)(B)(ii).
Id.
Id. § 5-64-505(a)(4)(B)(ii).
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owner did not have actual knowledge of the underlying criminal act.149 Subdivision (a)(4)(B)(ii) states that owners who should have known about the
use of the conveyance in a criminal offense can have that conveyance forfeited even if they had no actual knowledge of its criminal use.150
In 2019, the Arkansas legislature passed the Arkansas Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2019.151 This Act required a felony conviction before
property can be forfeited, subject to certain exceptions, such as the property
owner fleeing the state, making a plea deal, or failing to file an answer.152
With an understanding of both federal forfeiture law and Arkansas forfeiture law, the Arkansas law can be analyzed under the standards set forth
in Austin to determine whether the Arkansas law is punitive.153 If the Arkansas law is at least in part punitive, the Excessive Fines Clause governs, and
excessive fines under the Arkansas civil asset forfeiture statute are unconstitutional.154
V.

APPLICATION OF THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE TO ARKANSAS LAW

In Austin, the Court looked at three factors to determine whether the
federal forfeiture law was punitive.155 First, the Court considered the inclusion of innocent owner defenses in the statute.156 Second, the Court examined the connection of forfeiture to drug offenses.157 Lastly, the Court compared the statute’s text and legislative history to the historical understanding
of forfeiture as punishment to determine if there was a contradiction between the two.158
A.

Arkansas’s Statute Contains Innocent Owner Protections Like Those
in the Federal Statute in Austin

Arkansas’s statute contains several innocent owner defenses that indicate that the statute intends to punish only those who are not truly innocent.159 Section 5-64-505(a)(4)(B)(i) provides that a conveyance is not subject to forfeiture when the owner can show that the conveyance was used for

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. §§ 5-64-505(a)(4)(A), (a)(4)(B)(i), (a)(6)(B), (a)(8)(A).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-505(a)(4)(B)(ii).
Id. § 5-64-505(m).
Id.
See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 618–22 (1993).
See id.
Id. at 615–23; see supra, Section III.
Austin, 509 U.S. at 619.
Id. at 620.
Id. at 620–22.
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-64-505(a)(4)(A)–(B)(i), (a)(6)(B), (a)(8)(A) (West 2020).
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criminal purposes “without his or her knowledge or consent.”160 Section 564-505(a)(4)(B)(ii) deals with negligence and states that the conveyance can
still be forfeited if the owner knew or should have known the conveyance
was being used to violate the law.161
The language used in the Arkansas statute is very similar to the language used in the federal statute addressed in Austin.162 The federal statute
stated in § 881(a)(4)(A): “[N]o conveyance . . . shall be forfeited . . . unless
it shall appear that the owner or other person in charge of such conveyance
was a consenting party or privy to a violation.”163 And § 881(a)(4)(C) states
that “no conveyance shall be forfeited . . . by reason of any act or omission .
. . without the knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the owner.”164 The
federal statute also included an innocent owner exception in § 881(a)(7),
when it stated: “[N]o property shall be forfeited under this paragraph . . . by
reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.”165
The Arkansas statute is extremely similar, beginning with the first subsection under § 5-64-505(a)(4)(A): “No conveyance . . . is subject to forfeiture . . . unless it appears that the owner or other person in charge of the
conveyance is a consenting party or privy to a violation.”166 The second paragraph under § 5-64-505(a)(4) echoes the third paragraph under § 881(a)(4),
as § 5-64-505(a)(4)(B)(i) provides: “No conveyance is subject to forfeiture .
. . by reason of any act or omission established by the owner of the conveyance to have been committed or omitted without his or her knowledge or
consent.”167 This mirrors the federal statute, as the language from both excludes forfeiture when the owner of the conveyance did not have knowledge
or consent of the use of the conveyance in violation of the law. Section 564-505(a)(8)(A) of the Arkansas Code states: “No real property is subject to
forfeiture under this chapter by reason of any act or omission established by
the owner of the real property . . . to have been committed or omitted without his or her knowledge or consent.”168 This is very similar to § 881(a)(7),
as both state that the property cannot be forfeited due to an act that was
committed without the owner’s knowledge or consent.169

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at § 5-64-505 (a)(4)(B)(i).
Id. at § 5-64-505 (a)(4)(B)(ii).
Compare id. § 5-64-505, with 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1996) (amended 2000).
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(A) (1996) (amended 2000).
Id. § 881(a)(4)(C).
Id. § 881(a)(7).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-505(a)(4)(A).
Id. § 5-64-505(a)(4)(B)(i).
Id. § 5-64-505(a)(8)(A).
Compare id., with 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1996) (amended 2000).
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The Arkansas statute contains nearly identical language to the statute
that the Supreme Court of the United States called punitive.170 The Supreme
Court reasoned that innocent-owner exceptions in a forfeiture statute impart
a punitive nature by focusing on owner culpability.171
Not only does Arkansas provide an innocent owner exception, but it also follows federal law in carving out an exception to the innocent owner
exception when the owner is negligent.172 Section 5-64-505(a)(4)(B)(ii) provides that an innocent owner can be punished when the owner “either knew
or should reasonably have known that the conveyance would be used to
transport or in any matter to facilitate the transportation . . . of property [in
violation of this chapter].”173 The Supreme Court in Austin stated that historically the innocence of the owner was rejected as a common law defense to
forfeiture, under the theory that when the owner allows his property to be
misused, he has been negligent and can be punished for that negligence.174
In Austin, the Court held that the federal forfeiture statute was punitive
in part because it contained innocent owner exceptions that focused on the
guilt or innocence of the owner of the property.175 Therefore, Arkansas’s law
must be punitive because it contains nearly identical language to the statutes
analyzed in Austin under the Supreme Court’s analysis of innocent owner
provisions.
B.

Arkansas’s Forfeiture Statute is Connected to the Violation of Drug
Offenses

Arkansas’s forfeiture statute is in Title 5 of Arkansas’s Code, where
criminal offenses are located.176 More specifically, the statute is located in
Chapter 64 of the Code, which deals with controlled substances.177 Each of
the items subject to forfeiture under this section is tied to violations under
Chapter 64.178 For example, any property that is used as a container for controlled substances is forfeitable.179 Any conveyance used or intended to be
used in violation of the chapter is forfeitable.180 Anything of value, including
firearms, that is used as a means of exchange for a controlled substance in

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 619–22 (1993).
Id. at 619.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-505(a)(4)(B)(ii).
Id. (emphasis added).
Austin, 509 U.S. at 615.
Id. at 615–19.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-505.
Id.
Id. § 5-64-505(a).
Id. § 5-64-505(a)(3).
Id. § 5-64-505(a)(4).
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violation of the chapter can be forfeited.181 Finally, real property can also be
forfeited when it is used or intended to be used in violation of Chapter 64.182
The language of each of these subsections is similar to the language of
the federal statute in Austin that the Court stated was a punitive statute.183 In
Austin, the court considered forfeitures of a conveyance and real property.184
Tying the forfeiture of this property to the commission of drug offenses revealed a congressional intent to punish through forfeiture only those involved in drug offenses.185 The Arkansas statute provides evidence of the
same: the link between forfeiture and commission of the drug offenses reveals an intent to punish only those involved in drug trafficking.186
Because Arkansas’s forfeiture statute is tied together with commissions
of criminal offenses, like the statute in Austin, Arkansas law is punitive as
well as the statute in Austin. In sum, the tethering reveals an intent by the
Arkansas legislature to punish those involved in drug offenses.
C.

The Legislative History and the Text Support the Proposition That the
Forfeiture Statute is Punitive

Two factors analyzed under Austin were quite similar relating to legislative history. The first was that the federal legislative history did not contradict the historical understanding of forfeiture as punishment in any
way.187 The second was that the actual legislative history showed congressional intent to tie forfeiture to criminal punishment.188
There is limited evidence of legislative intent in Arkansas due to the
fact that records of committee meetings and their contents are not generally
available. However, there is evidence of legislative intent through the texts
of the acts passed by the legislature.
In 2019, the Arkansas General Assembly passed the Arkansas Civil
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2019.189 This Act required a criminal conviction before property can be forfeited under § 5-64-505.190 This Act has
been codified at Arkansas Code Annotated § 5-64-505(m).191

181. Id. at § 5-64-505(a)(6).
182. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-505(a)(8).
183. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
184. Id. at 604–05.
185. Id. at 619–20.
186. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-505.
187. Id. at 619–20.
188. Id.
189. Arkansas Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2019, 2019 Ark. Acts 476 (codified
at ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-505(m) (West 2019)).
190. Id.
191. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-505(m) (West 2020).
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The criminal conviction requirement comes with exceptions.192 If the
person from whom the property was seized died, was deported, was granted
immunity or reduced punishment for testifying or assisting a law enforcement or a prosecution, fled the jurisdiction or failed to appear, failed to answer the complaint for forfeiture, abandoned or disclaimed ownership, or
agreed in writing to the disposition of the property, the conviction requirement is waived.193
The passage of this Act shows an intent to tie forfeiture to criminal activity.194 Similar to the inclusion of the innocent owner defense, the legislature’s goal in this text is to prevent innocent owners from forfeiting their
property and to ensure only guilty owners have their property forfeited.195
The General Assembly also passed a forfeiture law in 1999—the Uniform Controlled Substances Act—Forfeiture of Property.196 At the beginning
of this Act, the General Assembly quoted language from a comment to section 505 of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act that might be read to
imply the General Assembly’s intent with respect to asset forfeiture is remedial only.197 However, immediately after the quoted language from the
comment, the General Assembly explicitly lays out its intent with this Act:
uniformity and accountability in the forfeiture process.198 This is further
shown through the amendments made to Arkansas’s forfeiture law in the
Act: they pertain to stricter time limits to initiate forfeiture proceedings and
stricter governmental controls over forfeited property.199
This legislative intent to tie forfeiture to criminal convictions provides
further evidence that forfeiture under the Arkansas statute is punitive and
should be limited by the Eighth Amendment.200 This matches the facts in
Austin: that the legislature intended for forfeiture to serve in part as punish-

192. Id. § 5-64-505(m)(2).
193. Id.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. Uniform Controlled Substances Act—Forfeiture Of Property, 1999 Arkansas Laws
Act 1120 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-505 (West 2019)).
197. Id. (“As stated in the comment to section 505 of the Uniform Controlled Substances
Act, ‘Effective law enforcement demands that there be a means of confiscating the vehicles
and instrumentalities used by drug traffickers . . . to prevent their use in the commission of
subsequent offenses . . . .’”).
198. Id. (“The General Assembly recognizes the importance of asset forfeiture as a means
to confront drug trafficking. However, the General Assembly also recognizes . . . the lack of
uniformity and accountability in forfeiture procedures across the state has undermined confidence in the system.”).
199. Id. (“[T]ime limits for initiating forfeiture proceedings and stricter controls over
forfeited property will help alleviate such problems while strengthening forfeiture as a vital
weapon against drug trafficking.” (emphasis in original)).
200. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 619 (1993).
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ment due to the connection of forfeiture to criminal violations.201 Furthermore, there is nothing in these acts or elsewhere that shows that the General
Assembly meant to contradict the historical understanding of forfeiture as
punishment that was described in Austin.202
D.

Arkansas’s Courts Have Long Recognized Forfeiture as Penal in Nature

While there may not be extensive evidence of the General Assembly’s
intent within the legislative history, several Arkansas courts, going back to
1985, have stated that forfeiture is indeed penal.203
In Gallia v. State, the Supreme Court of Arkansas considered whether a
mobile home could be included among “conveyances, aircraft, vehicles[,]
and vessels.”204 The Court stated that because forfeitures are penal in nature,
they are disfavored, and thus the mobile home was not interpreted to be included as a conveyance, aircraft, vehicle, or vessel.205
Next, in Beebe v. State, the Supreme Court of Arkansas considered
whether the forfeiture of firearms was valid without a hearing.206 While there
were arguments considering a motion, there was no hearing, so the court
returned the weapons to Beebe.207 The court held this because forfeiture is
penal in nature, and the statute must be interpreted narrowly.208
In Burnett v. State, the Court of Appeals of Arkansas considered
whether there was evidence that a truck was transporting a controlled substance for an unlawful purpose.209 The court stated that forfeiture was penal
in nature, and thus the statute had to be construed narrowly. 210 The court
reversed due to the lack of evidence the truck was being employed to
transport methamphetamine.211
In Ridenhour v. State, the Court of Appeals of Arkansas once again
considered forfeiture of a vehicle for purposes of transporting a drug for sale

201. Id.
202. Id. at 610–15.
203. Gallia v. State, 287 Ark. 176, 179, 697 S.W.2d 108, 110 (1985); Beebe v. State, 298
Ark. 119, 120, 765 S.W.2d 943, 944 (1989); Burnett v. State, 51 Ark. App. 144, 146, 912
S.W.2d 441, 442 (1995); Ridenhour v. State, 98 Ark. App. 116, 119, 250 S.W.3d 566, 569
(2007).
204. 287 Ark. at 179, 697 S.W.2d at 110.
205. Id.
206. 298 Ark. at 120–21, 765 S.W.2d at 943–44.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 120, 765 S.W.2d at 944.
209. 51 Ark. App. 144, 146, 912 S.W.2d 441, 442 (1995).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 145, 912 S.W.2d at 441.
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or receipt.212 The court stated that because forfeiture was penal in nature, the
statute must be interpreted narrowly, and simply finding drugs in a vehicle
does not automatically make the vehicle used for transportation for the sale
of the drugs.213
In King v. State, the Court of Appeals of Arkansas considered whether
a vehicle’s owner lost her interest in the vehicle under the forfeiture statute.214 Even though the court stated the statute must be interpreted narrowly
because forfeiture was penal in nature, it upheld the trial court’s decision
that the vehicle could be forfeited.215
Each of these cases established that the Arkansas forfeiture statutes
must be interpreted narrowly because forfeiture is penal in nature.216 This
case law further provides evidence that forfeiture in Arkansas is punitive
and thus governed by the Excessive Fines Clause.
Analyzing Arkansas’s law under the factors analyzed in Austin leads to
the conclusion that Arkansas’s law is punitive and therefore governed by the
Excessive Fines Clause.217 First, Arkansas’s law contains innocent-owner
provisions that focus on the culpability of the owner, allowing innocent
owners to be free from forfeiture but punishing guilty owners by forfeiting
their property.218 Second, Arkansas’s law ties forfeiture to criminal offenses,
thus showing the General Assembly’s intent to punish through forfeiture.219
Finally, the Arkansas Courts have held that forfeiture in Arkansas is punitive in nature.220 These factors, enunciated by the Supreme Court in Austin,
thus establish that the Arkansas government cannot constitutionally impose
excessive fines through the Arkansas forfeiture statute.221
E.

Other Jurisdictions Apply the Excessive Fines Clause to State Forfeiture Statutes

The conclusion above that Arkansas forfeiture law is penal in nature
and thus subject to the Excessive Fines Clause is bolstered by the analyses
of courts in other states.

212. 98 Ark. App. 116, 120–21, 250 S.W.3d 556, 569–70 (2007).
213. Id. at 119–20, 121, 250 S.W.3d at 569, 570.
214. 2014 Ark. App. 554, at 1–6, 447 S.W.3d 126, 127–30.
215. Id., 447 S.W.3d at 128–30.
216. Gallia v. State, 287 Ark. 176, 179, 697 S.W.2d 108, 110 (1985); Beebe v. State, 298
Ark. 119, 120, 765 S.W.2d 943, 944 (1989); Burnett v. State, 51 Ark. App. 144, 146, 912
S.W.2d 441, 442 (1995); Ridenhour, 98 Ark. App. at 119–20, 250 S.W.3d at 569.
217. See supra Section V.
218. See supra Section V.A.
219. See supra Section V.C.
220. See supra Section V.D.
221. See supra Section V; Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610–20 (1993).
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After Timbs’ case was heard in the Supreme Court, it was remanded
back to state court in Indiana. The court there held that forfeiture of his vehicle was a punitive fine under the Excessive Fines Clause.222 The court held
this because the statute focuses on the owner’s involvement in crime, and
the statute includes an innocent-owner defense.223 The State of Indiana
agreed that the statute in Indiana was at least partly punitive by nature and
thus was subject to the Excessive Fines Clause.224 The State of Indiana’s
only counterargument was to argue that the forfeiture of Timbs’ vehicle was
not excessive.225 Each of these factors applies to Arkansas’s statute as well.
Arkansas’s statute focuses on involvement in crime,226 and Arkansas’s statute includes innocent-owner defenses.227
A federal district court in New York has noted that when state civil forfeiture serves a punitive purpose, an Excessive Fines Clause analysis is conducted.228 The court also explained that the Excessive Fines Clause did not
prohibit forfeiture, but only limited it.229
Tennessee also applied the Excessive Fines Clause analysis prior to
Timbs.230 Tennessee reads its constitutional provision as coextensive with
the United States Constitution’s provision on excessive fines.231 The Supreme Court of Tennessee stated that forfeiture is in part at least punitive,
and thus the Tennessee Constitution’s excessive fines clause applies “even
to civil in rem forfeitures of property.”232
These cases show that other jurisdictions apply an Excessive Fines
Clause analysis to forfeiture when that forfeiture is at least in part punitive.
These other jurisdictions have held that the Excessive Fines Clause applies
to forfeiture when it is punitive, and forfeiture can be punitive because of:
(1) the inclusion of innocent-owner defenses in the statute; (2) the law’s
tying forfeiture to crimes; (3) the legislature’s intent for forfeiture to be punitive; and (4) courts’ having held that forfeiture is punitive. 233

222. State v. Timbs, 134 N.E.3d 12, 24 (Ind. 2019).
223. Id. at 23–24.
224. Id. at 24.
225. See id.
226. See supra Sections V.B–C.
227. See supra Section V.A.
228. See Santagata v. Diaz, No. 17CV3053, 2019 WL 2164082, at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y. May
17, 2019).
229. Id. at *3.
230. Stuart v. State Dep’t of Safety, 963 S.W.2d 28, 34 (Tenn. 1998).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See supra Section V.
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Arkansas’s Forfeiture Statute is Not Entirely Remedial

A possible counterargument could be raised that Arkansas’s forfeiture
statute is remedial only; this is the argument the Government raised in Austin.234 The Government made two arguments for why the statute should be
considered remedial in Austin: it removes the instruments of the drug trade
from criminals, and the forfeiture serves to compensate law enforcement for
its expenditure on problems such as drugs.235 However, in Austin, the Court
held that the forfeiture only needed to serve some punitive purpose, not be
punitive only, to be subject to the Excessive Fines Clause.236 Austin continues to be good law, and when a forfeiture statute serves at least some punitive purpose, the Excessive Fines Clause will apply to that forfeiture.237
VI.

CONCLUSION

One of the earliest limitations of government power to extract payments existed in Magna Carta, signed in 1215.238 Since then, the English Bill
of Rights, the Virginia Declaration of Rights, the Constitution, and state
constitutions have imposed some form of limitation on excessive fines.239
Despite these limitations, governments have continued to impose excessive fines, whether it be seventeenth-century Stuart kings, southern States
after the Civil War, or state and local governments today that heavily rely on
fines and fees.240 In Arkansas, these fines sometimes take the form of civil
asset forfeiture and should thus be governed by the Excessive Fines Clause
after Timbs incorporated the clause against the states.241 Like the statute analyzed in Austin, the Arkansas statute is punitive, and the Excessive Fines
Clause protects against punitive payments imposed by the government.242
Arkansas practitioners should be aware of the newly-available defense
for clients targeted by civil asset forfeiture after Timbs and Austin. The
Framers wrote in this clause for a reason; they wanted to limit the government’s power.243 As lawyers and advocates, if this defense is not raised, the
government may be able to bypass this constitutional protection. Prosecut234. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 620–21 (1993).
235. Id. at 620.
236. Id. at 621–22.
237. See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 689 (2019); United States v. $63,530.00 in
U.S. Currency, 781 F.3d 949, 957 (8th Cir. 2015); Pimentel v. City of Los Angeles, 974 F.3d
917, 921 (9th Cir. 2020).
238. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 687.
239. Id. at 688–89.
240. Id. at 688.
241. See supra Section V.
242. See supra Section V.
243. See Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 687.
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ing attorneys should be aware of the limits enforced by the Constitution and
should strive to not go beyond those limits, which after Timbs include not
imposing excessive forfeitures.
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